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ABSTRACT
The growing complexity of full-scale systems has
surpassed the capabilities of most simulation
software to provide detailed models or gate-level
failure analyses. The process of system-level
diagnosis approaches the fault-isolation problem in
a manner that differs significantly from the
traditional and exhaustive failure mode search.
System-level diagnosis is based on a functional
representation of the system. For example, one can
exercise one portion of a radar algorithm (the Fast
Fourier Transform [FFF] function) by injecting
several standard input patterns and comparing the
results to standardized output results. An
anomalous output would point to one of several
items (including the FFT circuit) without specifying
the gate or failure mode. For system-level repair,
identifying an anomalous chip is sufficient.
We describe here an information theoretic and
dependency modeling approach that discards much
of the detailed physical knowledge about the system
and analyzes its information flow and functional
interrelationships. The approach relies on group
and flow associations and, as such, is hierarchical.
Its hierarchical nature allows the approach to be
applicable to any level of complexity and to any
repair level. This approach has been incorporated
in a product called STAM1 j (System Testability
and Maintenance Program) which has been
developed and refined through more than 10 years
of field-level applications to complex system
diagnosis. The results have been outstanding, even
spectacular in some eases. In this paper we
describe system-level testability, system-level
diagnoses, and the STAMP analysis approach, as
well as a few STAMP applications.
INTRODUCTION
System-level diagnosis has always been an
afterthought in system design. Initially (i.e, circa
1930) system-level failures announced themselves.
Parts fell off, items quit working, or the failure
symptom itself pointed to the subsystem that
demanded repair. As systems became more
complex a symptom indicated that a failure was
restricted to a small list of possible causes. Further
testing was undertaken to localize the failure to a
level consistent with repair.
As systems have grown in complexity we have been
forced to rely on testing that is an outgrowth of
product assurance rather than on field-derived
maintenance information. The easiest obtainable
test information has been that developed from
testing by the manufacturer during equipment
production. At the same time, the product
assurance people placed their resources on
intermediate production screening. Realizing that
system-level diagnosis was an extremely complex
problem, the manufacturer began to screen
incoming parts and to test at the detailed
subassembly level in an effort to avoid delivering a
malfunctioning system. What resulted was a
mismatch; that is, the tests that were available to
the field technician were not developed for system-
level diagnosis, but rather, for system verification
purposes. In fact, the tests were designed to avoid
any situation where system-level diagnosis was
required.
Because of this mismatch, system and test design
provided diagnosis that frequently resulted in 40%
or higher false "pull" rates, the result of high
ambiguity and labor-intensive test procedures, and
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false alarmsconsumedexcessivemaintenance
resources. Studies of the CH-54 and the F-16
showed that troubleshooting actions consumed as
much as 50% of the total labor-hours spent for
repair.' Data for the scheduled airlines revealed
similar trends for complex electronics? When
systems were sent back to the factory, a bench
check was performed and only two outcomes
resulted:
• A retest OK indicating improper diagnosis in
the field or inadequate bench checking
• An anomalous system to be discarded or
dissected for subassembly test
Both of these outcomes are unacceptable.
The situation in system diagnosis continued to
deteriorate, and the need for system-level diagnosis
was easily recognizable in the late 1970s and early
1980s. Readiness levels for military aircraft were
often low, with as few as 50% of the assets available
in some maintenance cycle. In the early 1980s,
several initiatives such as MATE, IFTE, and CASS
were underway, and a number of tools were being
developed, such as IDSS, STAMP and I-CAT. _s All
of these, to one extent or another, addressed the
system-level aspects of testability and diagnosis.
The first military specification for testability (MIL-
STD-2165) became effective in 19857
SYSTEM LEVEL TESTABILITY
According to MIL-STD-2165, testability is defined
as:
A design characteristic which allows the status
(operable, inoperable, or degraded) of an item to be
determined and the isolation of faults within the
item to be performed in a timely and efficient
manner?
The literature generally discusses different types of
testability when referring to system-level testability:.
inherent and achieved testability. Inherent testability
addresses the way the system is designed and
encompasses the ability to observe system behavior
under a variety of stimuli. Inherent testability is
defmed by the location, accessibility, and
sophistication of tests and test points that may be
included in the system. Achieved testability
addresses how the system is maintained. It is
defined by the results of the maintainability process
(such as false alarms, ambiguities, incorrect
isolations, no faults found). Note that the achieved
testability has the inherent testability as a goal and
no testability as a lower limit.
During the design phase, the testability analysis
should provide the following information related to
the inherent testability of the system:
Ambigu/ty Groups--Components which are
and components which are not uniquely
identifiable in the current system/test
configuration.
Fa/se Fa//ures--When multiple failures occur,
any combinations that can provide the same
symptoms as an unrelated single failure.
/Fu/den Fa//ures--When multiple failures
occur, their relationship, if any, and the root
cause of the failure hidden.
Information Fee_acks--Cycles of diagnostic
information. Feedbacks typically cause
isolation problems and result in larger-than-
acceptable ambiguity groups. Mapping
feedback is one of the first steps in improving
testability by reducing ambiguity grot_ps.
Nondetec6on._--Components that have failure
modes which are not observed by any of the
available tests.
Te_ /Xrpos/t_--Necessary additional and
unnecessary tests. Eliminating unnecessary
tests reduces maintenance complexity and test
program set (TPS) test times.
Tolerance to False Alarms--Any spedal
provisions required by the system to handle
potential false alarms.
Operationa//so/at/on--The probability that
one can expect to isolate 1, 2,.. or fewer
replaceable units. This information is critical
for logistic planning.
DIAGNOSIS AT THE SYSTEM LEVEL
As with testability, diagnosis often refers to more
than one concept. In this paper, three basic terms
are used with the diagnosis descriptions: detection,
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localization, and isolation. Detection refers to the
ability of a test, combination of tests, or a diagnostic
strategy to identify that a failure in some system
element has occurred. This term is often associated
with built-in test (BIT) and may actually be the
design criterion set upon BIT.
Localization refers to the ability to restrict a fault to
some subset of possible causes. This also is
associated with a combination of tests or a
diagnostic strategy. Clearly, all BIT that can detect
must also localize (to at least one of all possible
faults). If the localization is sufficient in most cases
to undertake repair, we often refer to the BIT as
smart BIT. BIT, however, is not the only diagnostic
technique that localizes. Often automatic test
equipment (ATE) and manual isolation techniques
use a diagnostic strategy that localizes the fault to a
degree sufficient to undertake repairs.
Isolation is often misused to represent that
localization has been achieved to a degree
consistent with a single repair unit. Actually, it
means that, through some test, combination of tests,
or diagnostic strategy, the specific cause of a fault
has been identified.
A diagnostic strategy should provide a limited set of
items:
• A procedure that brings the achieved
testability up to the level of the inherent
testability.
• A procedure that can fault-isolate (localize)
the system while optimizing one or more
criteria.
THE STAMP APPROACH
It is assumed that, at any analysis level, when an
engineer writes a full-scale physical simulation of
the entire system at a specific level of detail, he or
she will then be able to answer all of the testability
questions by meticulously tracing stimuli through
the system to observe responses. This is possible
when faults are exhaustively modeled, and the
engineer can determine such items as nondetection
and ambiguity. Unfortunately, because of the sheer
volume of computations required at higher levels of
complexity or by a larger system, this is not
practical. For example, suppose that we have a very
large-scale integrated (VLSI) c_p with 10,000 gates,
any one of which may be "stuck open" or "stuck
at," yielding 20,000 faults to model. If 4 such chips
are on board with other components, and 6 such
boards make up the digitizer in a color radar
display that has 23 such subsystems, we have to
model at least 11 million failure modes_
When we began to develop a less computationally
intense process, we wanted to build an analysis
method that is hierarchical and discards a fair
amount of the detail carried along in a physical
representation. First, we strip the test of its
stimulus-response detalk and turn it into an
information carrier. This is not to say that the
details of how the test is conducted are
unimportant. In fact, they are essential in actually
performing the test. We simply do not carry them
along in our analysis (but we do pick them up
later). Second, we ignore the details of gates,
resistors, and hardware implementations and,
rather, consider functions. The latter gives us a
hierarchical formulation because functions can be
aggregated from combinations of other functions,
and we can proceed functionally to any level in the
analysis. (A function, of course, carries with it an
aggregation of hardware or a piece of hardware.)
This in turn provides a way to "repair" functions.
What have we /ost? A great deal. We can no
longer use our model to provide the stimulus-
response details. A computer-aided drawing (CAD)
fde can no longer be used directly for input,
although we may be able to enter some of the
details through translation. The solution may be a
much grosser localization than a simulation model.
What have we gained? A great deal. We can now
perform our testability analysis in a hierarchical
manner. We can hypothesize information sources
without concerning ourselves with the details of
stimulus-response--until and unless we want to
actually perform the test. We can play what-if and
conduct trade-off analyses at a much simpler
modeling level. And we have a full range of
information theoretic tools to help us answer the
basic testability and fault-isolation questions.
One tool, STAMP, derives measures of testability
and synthesizes fault-lsolation strategies on the basis
of an information flow model of the system under
analysis. It is important to understand the
fundamentals of information flow modeling and
fault-isolation theory. The vehicle for information
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flowmodelingis a blockdiagramthatrepresents
the functionaltopologyof a given system.
Additional data available for the model include
hierarchical grouping, special inference, and cost
and other weighting criteria. A full range of
testability measures and tables is then produced to
provide the basic information listed in the
"Testability at the System Level" section. The
specifics as they apply to the STAMP analysis are
detailed in references 10 and 11, which include
example computations.
Fault isolation can be described mathematically as
a partition process. Let C = (c_, c2,...,cn) represent
the set of n components. After the jth test, a fault-
isolation strategy partitions C into one of two
classes:
FJ- (of.4 ...., (1)
where IcY is the set of components that are still
failure candidates after the jth test (feasible set),
and m is the number of components in the set. The
complement of this set is given by:
_.c -FY (2)
where Gj is dae set of components found to be
good after the jth test (infeasible set). This set will
contain m-n components.
By this structure, a strategy will have isolated a fault
when ICY consists of a single element or can no
longer be subdivided ( F! consists of a component
ambiguity group).
It can be proved that for a well-ordered system, a
half-interval search technique will provide the
minimum number of tests; however, such an
ordering rarely exists. The STAMP approach uses
an adaptive, information-based strategy, because in
seeking to overcome the d_'ficulty of ordering a
system for the half-interval technique, it became
apparent that if all dependencies in a system were
known, the information content of each test could
be calculated. If a test is performed, the set of
dependencies allows us to draw conclusions about a
subset of components.
The process of drawing conclusions about the
system from limited information is called inference.
For any test sequence, STAMP allows us to
compute (c/, cI,..., chj) and the set of remaining
failure candidates, namely F1, F2,..., P..An algorithm
has been developed to look at the information
content of all remaining tests so that the number of
remaining tests that must be performed to isolate
faults is minimized over the set of potential failure
candidates.
STAMP EFFECTIVENESS
It can be shown that for a well-ordered or
straightforward serial design, STAMP reduces to the
half-interval technique, which is known to be
optimal for that case. Unfortunately, the general
case is known to be NP-complete, TM so we are
forced to rely on an approximate solution. In a
number of applications, the adaptive, information-
theoretic approach has provided the mean and the
variance of the required number of tests under all
failure conditions, either equal to or lower than
those resulting from other procedures examined,
and often approaching the theoretical minimum
values. Table 1 lists a few of the more than 250
systems analyzed by STAMP.
SUMMARY
STAMP emphasizes diagnosis at the system level.
This emphasis differs from most other testability
analysis tools that operate at the gate or, at most,
board level. This system-level emphasis enables
STAMP to be hierarchically applied and enables the
engineer to approach the testability problem from
an information flow standpoint rather than from an
electronic simulation. An additional result is that
the approach is independent of the underlying
technology, thus allowing the analysis of most
systems, including hybrids. A shortcoming of this
approach is that it cannot be used to directly
develop the detailed definitions of the tests.
STAMP has been applied to many types Ofsystems,
and these appfications have been for a large number
of system technologies and at varying points in the
system life cycle. The results indicate that there is
a large potential gain in providing system-level
testability and diagnosis analyses.
I.
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Table1. Resultsof STAMPApplications
System Customer Results
ALR-67CountermeasuresSet
ALR-62WarningReceiver
Air PressurizationSystem
MSQ-103CTEAMPACK
Mk 8460/400HzStatic
UH-60A (Black Hawk)
Stability Augmentation System
ALO-131 Podded EW System
ALO-184 Podded EW System
B-2 Bomber DZr Program
NADC/USN
ALC/USAF
Int'l Fuel Cells
EW/RSTA/USA
NAVSEAi_JSN
ATL/USA
ASD/USAF
AFLC/USAF
USAF/Northrop
Developed test procedures for TRDs
Reduced ambiguity groups by over 40%
Unique isolation improved by over 100%
Reduced required testing by 87%; portable
maintenance aid developed
Reduced required testing by 70%; portable
frequency converter maintenance aid developed
Reduced mean time to fault-isolate by factor of
10; reduced maintenance complexity by factor of 3
Reduced mean time to fault-isolate by 75%
Reduced false-alarm rate by a factor of 10;
developed UUT software procedures
Improved specification compliance at the shop
replaceable unit (SRU) level by 80%
REFERENCES
1. Cook, Thomas N., et al. "Analysis of Fault
Isolation Criteria/Techniques," Proceedings --
Annual Reliability and Maintainability Symposium,
San Francisco, CA, January 1980.
2. Aeronautical Radio, Inc. Avionics Maintenance
Conference Report -- San Diego, 1987. Publication
87-087/MOF-34, Annapolis, MD, August 1987.
3. Cross, G. "Third Generation MATE--Today's
Solution." Proceedings of the 1987 IEEE
AUTOTESTCON Conference, San Francisco, CA,
November 1987.
4. Espesito, C. M., et al. "U.S. Army/qFTE
Technical and Management Overview." Proceedings
of the 1986 IEEE AUTOTESTCON Conference, San
Antonio, TX, September 1986.
5. Najaran, Captain M. T., "CASS Revisited--A
Case for Supportability," Proceedings of the 1986
IEEE AUTOTESTCON Conference, San Antonio,
TX, September 1986.
6. Franco, J. R. "Experiences Gained Using the
Navy's IDSS Weapon System Testability Analyzer,"
Proceedings of the 1988 IEEE AUTOTESTCON
Conference, Minneapolis, MN, September 1988.
7. Simpson, W. R., and Sheppard, J. W.,
"Experiences with a Model-Based Approach to the
Fault Detection and Isolation of Complex Systems,"
Symposium on Artificial Intelligence Applications in
Military Logistics, Williamsburg, VA, March 1990.
8. Cantone, R. A., and Caserta, P., "Evaluating the
Economical Impact of Expert Fault Diagnosis
Systems: The I-CAT Experience," 3rd IEEE
International Symposium on Intelligent Control,
Arlington, VA, August 1988.
9. Testability Program for Electronic Systems and
Equipment, MIL-STD-2165, Washington, DC,
Naval Electronic Systems Command, January 1985.
10. Sheppard, John W., and Simpson, William R.,
"A Mathematical Model for Integrated
Diagnostics," IEEE Design and Test of Computers,
Vol. 8, No. 4, December 1991, pp. 25-38.
11. Simpson, William R., and Sheppard, John W.,
"System Testability Assessment for Integrated
Di _guostics," IEEE Design and Test of Computers,
Vol. 9, No. 1, March 1992, pp. 40-54.
12. Hyafd, Laurent, and Rivest, Ronald L.,
"Constructing Optimal Binary Decision Trees is
NP-Complete," Information Processing Letters, Vol.
5, No. 1, May !976, pp. 15-17.
631
BiographicalSketches of the Authors
John W. Sheppard holds a B.S. in Computer Science from Southern Methodist University and an M.S. in
Computer Science (emphasizing Artificial Intelligence) from The Johns Hopkins University, where he is
currently a Ph.D. candidate in Computer Science. His research areas include fault diagnosis, machine
learning, neural networks, and knowledge representation. His work has included the development of A.I.
techniques and algorithms that are being applied in system diagnosis, knowledge base verification, and
software classification. Mr. Sheppard is one of the principal developers of an intelligent, interactive
maintenance assistant (Portable Interactive Troubleshooter -- POINTER) which guides a diagnostic process
through test choice and evaluation, explains reasoning, and incorporates elements of evidential reasoning and
neural networks to process information obtained from uncertain or incomplete testing. Mr. Sheppard is a
senior research analyst in the Advanced Research and Development Group at The ARINC Research
Corporation. He can be reached by e-mail at sheppard@cs.jhu.edu
William R. Simp_¢n holds a B.S. in Aerospace Engineering from the Va. Polytechnic Institute and State
University, an M.S.A. in Engineering Management from the George Washington University, as well as, an
M.S. and a Ph.D. in Aerospace Engineering from the Ohio State University. He is also a graduate of the
U.S. Naval Test Pilot School in Patuxent River, Maryland. His work in the area of testability and fault
diagnosis resulted in the development of the System Testability and Maintenance Program (STAMP) which
uses an information flow model to assess system testability and generate efficient fault isolation strategies.
He was also a principal developer of the POINTER system which includes reasoning under uncertainty,
similarity and explanation based learning, logical inference, and decision optimization. In addition to
STAMP and POINTER, Dr. Simpson applied the information modeling approach to non-cooperative target
recognition (Non-Cooperative All-Source Target Identification -- NASTI) and to electronic warfare signal
sorting (Signal Evaluation for Emitter Recognition -- SEER). He has also participated in the development
of neural networks for software classification and reasoning termination. Dr. Simpson is a research fellow in
the Advanced Research and Development Group at the ARINC Research Corporation. He can be reached
by e-mail at wsimpson@mcimail.com
632
